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FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE OIL MARKET
The oi 1 ma~Ket has gone th~ough majo~ changes in its
st~uctu~e ove~ the past twenty yea~s. The changes that have
occu~ed can be att~ibuted to events in both the oil
p~oducing and consuming count~ies. Both the pol itica1 and
economic events that tooK place in the count~ies di~ect1y
and indi~ectly affected the oil ma~ket. Specific types of
events howeve~ seemed to be p~eva1ent du~ing the pe~iods of
change in the ma~ket. These events we~e usually a
~etal iation to a p~evious event that may o~ may not have had
a di~ect effect on the oil ma~Ket, but did conce~n the
pa~ticula~ count~y.
Pol itica1 un~est in a count~y such as a wa~ o~ a change
in the gove~nment th~ough a nondemoc~atic means played the
la~gest ~ole in instigating a change. Wa~s affected the
ma~Ket both di~ect1y and indi~ectly. A di~ect consequence
of a wa~ in a oil p.woucing count~y was the dec~ease in
p~oduction by that count~y. Also effected we~e the means of
t~anspo~tation of oil (e.g. canals, gulfs, shipping,
pipel ines, etc.) which the count~y had cont~ol ove~ and
othe~ count~ies depended on fo~ thei~ p~oduction. The loss
of p~oduction and the inc~eased unce~tainties caused by the
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war usually led to an increase in prices. Another indirect
effec t of war was the re ta 1 iat ion by other coun tr ies that
sometimes occurred in support or opposition to a warring
country. Retal iation in the form of an embargo would
further reduce supplY and place upward pressure on the price
of 0 i 1 .
The change in the rul ing party through assassination or
revolution usually only had an indirect effect on the oil
market, however the effect could be significant. The new
pol icies that are innacted by the new government could
affect any part of the oil market. Not only do the pol icies
8 directly affect the supply, distribution, and price of oil,
but it also, like war., will incr.ease the uncertainties
associated with a new government, this could lead to higher
prices through speculation on the increased risks.
Changes in government pol icies can occur from other
factors besides a change in the rul ing party. As already
noted, retal iation to a war or other event that a government
dissapproves of could directly affect the oil market.
Embargos are used as a means of retal iation against a
specific country. It is normally done to reduce the supplY





~educing a count~y~s ~evenues by ~efusing to pu~chase f~om
that count~y.
National ization of oil concessions is anothe~ change in
gove~nment pol icies that has a di~ect effect on the oil
ma~Ket. This al lows the oil p~oducing count~ies to gain
con t~ol ove~ the p~oduc t ionn and p~ ic ing of the 0 i1 in the i~
count~y. This effectively changes the cont~ol of the oil
ma~Ket f~om the consumers (oil companies) to the producers (
oil producing countries).
Anothe~ minor form of retal iation is the enactment of
conservation pol icies by consuming count~ies aimed at maKing
themselfs less dependent on fo~iegn oil. The plan is to
reduce the demand for oil, rel ieving the upward pressure on
oil prices. A p~oblem with this type of pol icy occurs when
the gove~nment 1imits the profits earned by the domestic oil
companies through taxation or regulation on prices which
reduces the incentive fo~ exploration. The reduced
explo~ation reduces the Known reserves by not replacing the
consumed reserves with new finds. This will lead to a
1ong-~un independence p~obl em of 0 i1 irl the coun tr'y.
Exchange rates and inflation a~e economic facto~s, but
because of their significance in effecting pol itical
decisions they can be conside~ed pol itical events. Exchange
3
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~ates would be of less impo~tance if the p~ice of a ba~~el
of oil was based on a standa~d moneta~y unit~ but because it
is based on the U.S. dolla~ the state of the U.S. economy
becomes a facto~ in the p~ice. This causes conce~n among
oil p~oducing count~ies~ fo~ not only does the value of the
dolla~ fluctuate against othe~ cu~~encies but it is a facto~
that the oi 1 p~oduc ing count~ ies have ve~y 1 ittl e cont~ol
ove~. The cont~ol that the count~ies do have is counte~
p~oductive f~om thei~ view. Fo~ thei~ only means of cont~ol
to inc~ease the value of the dolla~~ is to ~educe the p~ice
of oil so as to st~engthen the U.S. economy.
8 Inflation has constantly ~educed any ~eal gain in the
pr'ice of oil that the oil p~oducing count~ies ha'Je
implemented. Since inflation has seemed to be a constant
facto~ that was influenced negatively by any inc~ease in
p~ices that we~e made~ inflation neve~ appea~ed to be a
majo~ conce~n of the oil p~oducing count~ies in any of the
decisions that they made.
8
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8SIGNIFICANT PERIODS IN THE OIL MARKET
The factors just outl ined have appeared in many forms
and combinations over the last two decades. The interaction
between these factors have caused oil prices to change
dramatically over short periods of time. But no change in
the price or supply of oi 1 appears to have just happened
with no underlying cause. Supply and demand theory can be
used to explain why things happened in the oil marKet the
way they did, but it can not explain why the events that
occurred in the first place to cause the change. The
8 pol itical events that did occur were for the most part
uncontrollable by forces outside of a particular country,
but their effect on matters that concerned the whole world
are of importance.
The overview of the past twenty years can be viewed as
five periods of price change or stabil ity. From 1965-1969
prices remained relatively constant. From 1970-1974 The
world felt the first major increase in oil prices. From
1975-1978 a period of relative calm occurred. From
1979-1981 prices jumped dramatically for the second time.
And from 1982-1985 prices have made a correction for the
past increase. By looKing at the events that occurred
8 during these time periods, a correlation between the changes
5
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Up and through th is per iod , the 0 i1 industry was
dominated by the oil companies. Complete control over
production and pricing pol icies were decided by the oil
companies. In 1960 a group of oil producing countries
formed OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
in an attempt to develope unity among the countries when
deal ing with outside forces. OPEC "declared that the price
reductions should be rescinded and future changes in prices
8 should be effected in consultation with individual
governments."1 But the succes of this group to carry out any
of their declarations was very 1imited at this time. These
circumstances meant relative stabl ility for the oil marKet.
There were few events that occurred in the period that
affec ted the 0 i1 industry. Even when an even t did occur,
such as the third Arab-Israel i war, nothing significant
occurred. There was an attempt to impose an embargo
against France, but because of the ineffectiveness of OPEC





The oil companies' abil ity to impose total cont~ol ove~
the 0 i 1 in du s t ~ y me an t tot a 1 stab i 1 i t y
. Nom in alp ~ ice s
~emained constant while the~e was only a mino~ loss in ~eal
p~ice caused by inflation. P~oduction and ~ese~ves
inc~eased at a steady ~ate Keeping in st~ide with inc~eases
in demand. P~ices howeve~ we~e in ~eal ity a~tificially low,






This was the first period of real change in the
structure of the oil market. Up to this point OPEC was very
ineffective in controll ing any aspect of the oil market.
The change started in September of 1969 when "King ldris of
Libya was overthrown in a mil itary coup led by Col. Moamer
Qadafi".2 Because of Qadafi's hard 1 ine pol icies that he
implemented he was able to lead Libya to a position of
dominance in OPEC. Libya was the first country to go
8
against the oil companies and implement a price increase and
also raise taxes and be successful. A few months later the
rest of OPEC followed with the same increases in the
historic Tehran agreement. The Tehran Agreement "introduced
the principle that their governments were codeterminants,
with the oil companies, of the prices of crude oil.,,3 This
was the first time that OPEC acted with any authority and
cooperation, which lent to their credibil ity. There were
also announcements made by them of retal iation that they
would take against any country that refused to honor the new
pol icies that they passed.
For OPEC the oil companies posed the greatest threat to





of Moamer Qadafi the OPEC nations began to national ize their
oil concessions. The General Participation Agreement that
was signed in December of 1972 allowed "the governments to
aquire a majority interest in the concessions of their
operating companies over- a period of ten years."4 This not
only increased the control of the production and pricing of
oil that the oil producing countries had, but it also
el iminated the power that the oil companies had concerning
these matters. The unity that OPEC showed in these acts
were significant in building their credibil ity as an
organization that had to be dealt with.
The Yom Kippur war which began on October 6, 1973 was
OPEC's first chance to prove that it now controlled the oil
market. In direct retal iation to the war, OPEC increased
oil prices and decreased oil production. It also felt that
the U.S. and the Netherlands were directly responsible for
Israel's actions since the U.S. a year earl ier had agreed to
supply Israel with jet fighting aircraft, and so imposed an
oil embargo on those nations. Unl ike the first embargo that
OPEC attempted, this embargo was successful because of the
decrease in production. Since production decreased the U.S.
and the Netherlands were unable to obtain additional
suppl ies of oil through indirect sources. Had the pol itcal
events not occurred earl ier in the decade, OPEC would not
10
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have had the control, credibil ity and unity it needed to be
effective.
Another major concern was the fall ing U.S. dollar.
Even with the gains in prices imposed earl ier in the period,
the fall in the dollar was reducing the real profits earned
to a point where the gains were almost insignificant. This
was the subject that was discussed in the Geneva Devaluation
Agreement in January 1972 and the Supplemental Agreement in
June 1973. These agreements called for increases in the
price of oil to offset the lose in value felt by the
decrease in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar.
8
The increase in power of the OPEC nations meant a
steady rise in prices up to the Yom Kippur War at which
point oil was turned into a diplomatic tool to try and
achieve the goals that the oil producing countries wanted to
obtain. None of these increases could have been obtained had







OPEC had let the world know that it was now a real
entity that must be dealt with when it came to oil pol icies.
With oil prices at an all time high contentment seemed to be
the attitude of all nations during this period. Even the
U.S. dollar was working in OPEC's favor as it began to rise
as the U.S. economy began to pickup after the recession of
1974-1975. The only significant factor affecting prices was
the inflation rate~ but even that could not e1 iminate all of
the gains in prices that were made in the earl ier period.
One event did occur that when looked at directly would
seem to not have that significant of an effect on the oil
market~ but when looKed at in the context of events that
would occur after this date the significance appears to be
important. On March 25~ 1975 King Faisai of Saudi Arabia
was assassinated and succeeded by King Kha1ed. The effect
of this event was not innitia11y seen as the change in
government appeared to have pretty much the same pol icies as
the previous government. Only a subtle change occurred in
the attitude that was taken concerning the relationship
betweeen Saudi Arabia and the U.S.. After 1971 Saudi Arabia
became the leading country in OPEC so that pol icies made by
12
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them were always significant to the oil producing countries.
With Saudi Arabia as the number one oil producing country
and the U.S. as the number one oil consuming country on
better terms with each other this lead to some moderation in
the oil marKet. This is not to say that all major changes
were el iminated but this did Keep some changes that could
have occurred from occurring. This relationship may not at
first be evident but through examing future events a
distinct relationship seems to emerge.
Production during this period fell as consumer~s
demanded less oil as a result of the higher prices and were
8 less able to afford the prices as the U.S. economy went into
a recession at the beginning of the period. But as the
economy began to grow and consumers accepted the increases






This was the pe~iod of the second major increase in
prices, but unl iKe the fi~st one which was p~ima~ily the
result of p~oduce~s increasing prices because of internal
reasons, this time it was the consume~s that dictated the
inc~ease to p~oduce~s as a preceived dec~ease in the supply
of oil. The I~anian ~evolution was the catalyst that
sta~ted all of the events that we~e to follow. F~om 1971
until the ~evolution in 1978, I~an had been the second
leading count~y in OPEC. When the revolution broKe out,
I~an/s p~oduction fell. This lead Speculato~s to begin
bidding oil p~ices up on the spot ma~Ket. With the official
p~ice of oil being significantly less the the spot prices of
oil, oil p~oducing countries began to sell their oil on the
spot ma~Ket to taKe advantage of the inc~eased p~ices. In
an attempt to maintain unity and control over the oil ma~Ket
OPEC continuously ~aised the official price of oil.
Also Keeping the demand fo~ oi 1 at an artificially high
level was the stocKpil ing of oil by consuming count~ies. In
1980 fo~ example the U.S. had a ~eco~d level of oil in




p~ice of oil, but also upset the OPEC nations and led to
th~eats of ~etal iation if the p~actice was not stopped.
Mid 1980 also saw the beginning of the I~an-I~aq wa~.
This compounded the changes that occu~~ed because of the
I~anian ~evolution. Now not only was one count~y;s supply
~educed because of the ~evolution, but a second count~y now
had a ~educed p~oduction because of thei~ involvement in the
wa~. This wa~ also spilled ove~ onto the su~~ounding
count~ies as the~e we~e th~eats to shipping in the Pe~sian
Gulf.
Even though p~ices continued to cl imb because of the
speculation of sho~tages caused by the wa~ in I~an and I~aq
and the inc~ease in the demand b~ought about by stocK pil ing
the~e was neve~ a sho~tage of oil du~ing this time. What
had occu~~ed was that othe~ count~ies had inc~eased thei~
p~oduction to compensate fo~ any loss of supply that had
occu~~ed. Most of the supply was made up by Saudi
A~abia.This inc~ease in supply by Saudi A~abia appea~s to
be both economically and pol itically motivated. It was an
oppo~tunity fo~ them to inc~ease thei~ sha~e of the oil
ma~Ket, but It also was a way of ~epaying the U.S. fo~ the
inc~eased mi 1ita~y suppo~t that they we~e ~eceiving f~om the
U.S.. Fo~ example on Septembe~ 30, 1980 the U.S. sent Saudi
15
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Arabia four sophisticated surveillance planes to help Suadi
Arabia moniter the Iran-Iraq war. As a result of Saudi
Arabia accepting the planes, Qadafi, of Libya, announced to
"all Musl ims that they should forgo the annual rel igious
pilgrimage to Mecca because all of Saudi Arabia, including
Islam/s most sacred shrines, was /under U.S. occupation./"5
Saudi Arabia felt that this was a slur on their
"guardianship of Islamic holy places" and so cut its ties
with Libya. On May 26,1981 at a meeting of OPEC nations
Suadi Arabia refused to raise their price or decrease their
production of oil, which led to other OPEC countries placing
~
a freeze on prices and lowering their outputs.6 Then finally
on October 1, 1981 President Reagan said the U.S. would not
allow Saudi Arabia to fall under the control of forces
threatening to cut off oil suppl ies to the west.7
The U.S. at this time also began to taKe an active role
in trying to reduce their dependency on foreign oil. It
imposed an import fee on foreign oi 1, but then levied a
windfall profits ta.x on the oil companies. Oil imports did
fall along with demand but it would appear that the cause of
the decrease was more the increase in the price of oil then
the actions that were taKen. The windfall profit tax





made exploration less desirable as the money available for
this type of undertaKing became less.
Oil prices rose dramatically during this period and
remained high because of the uncertainties. The exchange
rate of the U.S dollar hit an all time low which somewhat
moderated the increase in price. It was also a period in
which demand increased faster then supply, but the demand
was not needed demand so that there were no real shortages.
Even with the large increases in the price, it was
becoming apparent that OPEC was beginning to loose the
control over the oil marKet that it had earl ier in the
decade. Price increases were no longer the result of OPEC
nations declaring an increase in price but rather the
speculators on the oil marKet bidding up the price of oil
based on a bel ieved shortage that never occurred. Since the
increase in prices were not caused by a real increase in
demand it should have been obvious that the prices could not





This last period appears to be one of correction for
the previous period. Prices were at an artificially high
level so when it became apparent that the supply of oi 1
would not decrease as drastically as originally expected and
that the demand for oil had been significantly reduced
because of the high prices~ the upward pressure on oil
prices was removed. With the lower demand for oi 1 and the
increased fear of deal ing with OPEC nations because of the
unrest in the Arab countries nations began to depend less
8 upon OPEC for their oil. This increased the number of
countries that had a share in the oil marKet and reduced
some of the importance of OPEC in controll ing the marKet.
The effect on the OPEC nations was great in that they had
become use to the large incomes in the past few years and
were now faced with reduced revenues as the amount of oi 1
that they could sell became less. This led to some OPEC
nations under cutting the official price as a means of
boosting the demand for their oil. This cycle continued
until the official price of oil fell and production quotas




With the ~etu~n of the buye~s ma~Ket, consuming
count~ies now had some cont~ol. The U.S., sta~ting on Ma~ch
10, 1982, was able to mount a successful oil embargo against
Libya as a means of protesting the alleged te~ro~ism that
Libya was suppo~ting. Libya had been sell ing two bill ion
dolla~s worth of oil a year to the U.S., which was one-forth
of thei~ total p~oduction. Both Libya and Iran we~e facing
financial problems that lead to unrest among the OPEC
countries, with Saudi Arabia being accused of taKing more
than the i~ fa~e share of t.he marKe t . Th is 1ead to a drop in
8
the production quotas on Decembe~ 20,1982 as Iran challenged
Saudi Arabia~s control ove~ OPEC.8
On Ma~ch 14, 1983 OPEC was fo~ced to ~educe the
of f icia 1 se 1 1 in g p r ice of the ir 0 i 1 by f ive do 1 1 ar s a bar r e 1
to twenty-nine dollars in an attempt to end the cutthroat
pricing and to t~y and ~esto~e an equil ibrium. But with the
demand for oil down and the economic p~essures on certain
OPEC members, the price war continued and a further cut in
p~rices occu~~ed in February of 1984.
A faKe glut of the oil marKet appeared, but in real ity
the glut was not there. What has occu~ed was that with the
shift in demand from the OPEC nations to other nations, and




was a temporary over supply of oil on the marKet. What has
happened is that non OPEC nations have had to increase their
production rate to point higher then in the past, so that
even though short-term problems are covered the long-run
solution is not taKen care of.
Also since 1981 the U.S. dollar has continued to gain
in strength to where in 1983 prices received by the oil
producing countries actually rose due to the higher dollar,
while the U.S. consumer price fell because of the rise.
Therefor it would seem that there has been no pressure on
the price of oil to cause it to rise.
8
The threat of Price and Production control by the OPEC
countries has gone into submission with many wondering
wether they can ever be a viable force again. It would
appear though that as the third world countries begin to
develope and increase theit demand for oil OPEC will have a
new source of revenue. The other oil producing countries
will have to supply a greater share of their own source of
oil and so exports from these countries to the developing
countries will be 1 imited at best. OPEC will only have a
1imited control over the third world countries, because
unl iKe the developed countries that they had been deal ing




developing countries cannot. This should mean a more





YEAR AND MONTH TAX-REFERENCE PRICES OFFICIAL SELLING PRICE























EVOLUTION OF CRUDE OIL POSTED OR TAX-REFERENCE PRICES AND
OFFICIAL SELLING PRICES FOR ARABIAN LIGHT 34 AT RAS TANURA,
SAUSI ARABIA 1948 - 1982 <U.S. DOLLAR PER BARREL)
8
1974 JANUARY 11 .65
NOVEMBER 11 .25 10.46
1975 OCTOBER 12.38 11.51
1977 ,JANUARY 13.00 12.09
JULY 13.67 12.70




1980 JANUARY 27.96 26.00
APRIL 30 .11 28.00
8 AUGUST 32.26 30.00
NOVEMBER 34.41 32.00
1981 JANUARY 34.41 32.00




SOURCES: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 1980. pp 135-37;
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, The Price of
Oil in Western Eur"ope, Neil H. Jacoby,
Multinational Oil (New YorK: Macmillan Co., 1974)
NOTES: Posted price for Arabian Light has been used by
OPEC member countries as the benchmarK price for
the crude-oil price structure. The official
sell ing price charged by any memberr country
including Saudi Arabia.
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